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Executive Summary
 
The United States Congress is currently 
devising the next farm bill. One of the many 
factors influencing the debate is the effect of 
trade agreements into which the United States 
has entered. Under the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s Agreement on Agriculture, government 
spending on trade-distorting agricultural 
policies (referred to as “amber box” policies) 
has been limited. However, if the policy is 
considered non-trade-distorting (“green box”), 
then spending on such a policy is not con-
strained under the agreement. We explore the 
possible construction of a green box policy 
that is countercyclical to factors related to 
 
agriculture. The policy is based on our 
interpretation of the green-box requirements; 
other interpretations are possible. The policy 
we construct would provide payments that are 
countercyclical to weather events and ex-
change rate movements (that is, the timing and 
size of the payments depends on weather 
events and exchange rate movements). Our 
model is but one of many possible configura-
tions of such an approach and was chosen as 
an example of how such a program might be 
implemented. Given our construction, we also 
estimate the cost of the new program.
  
 
 
 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF A “GREEN BOX”  
COUNTERCYCLICAL PROGRAM  
 
 
Introduction 
ACCORDING TO THE WORLD Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) trade agreement, program 
payments can be put into the (non-trade-
distorting) “green box” if payments are not 
related to current or past prices or production 
and if recipients are not required to produce 
anything to receive a payment. Countercycli-
cal payments that increase when price, yield, 
or revenue decrease all fall into the (trade-
distorting) “amber box.” The WTO agreement 
places no limits on green-box spending. U.S. 
amber-box spending is limited to $19.1 billion 
per year. 
 
 Many in Congress want to support 
farmers at a level higher than the amber-box 
spending limits would allow. Thus, nearly all 
proposals made by and to Congress continue 
the green-box Agricultural Market Transition 
Assistance (AMTA) payments (now referred 
to as fixed decoupled payments). The green-
ness of AMTA payments makes them attrac-
tive despite their political drawback of 
supporting farm income even when farm 
income is high. 
 
 The House farm bill has been criticized 
because it seemingly contradicts U.S. agricul-
tural trade policy proposals that aim to reduce 
program payments that distort trade. Both the 
new House countercyclical program and the 
continuation of marketing loans would put 
U.S. amber-box spending near or above the 
$19.1 billion limit. 
 
 One way to make U.S. farm policy more 
consistent with U.S. trade policy is to put a 
greater portion of payments into the green box. 
But farmers and politicians have said repeat-
edly that they prefer countercyclical programs 
to fixed decoupled payments. The trick is to 
devise a countercyclical payment program that 
meets the green-box criteria. To many, this 
would require a new definition of counter-
cyclical. After all, if payments are to arrive 
when the well-being of farmers is low, and the 
well-being of farmers is determined by price 
and yield, how can a countercyclical payment 
program not be triggered by price, yield, or 
revenue? The key is to devise an index that is 
triggered by factors other than price, yield, or 
revenue but that is still countercyclical to 
factors important to agriculture.  
 
 In this paper we describe how an index 
that is not directly related to current price or 
production could be constructed. We also 
demonstrate how it could be used to trigger 
program payments. Our example is just one 
index that could be constructed. Other vari-
ables could be used, and other constraints 
could be imposed to construct other viable 
indexes. Our purpose here is not to advocate 
this particular policy approach. Rather, it is to 
demonstrate one solution to the puzzle of 
constructing a green-box countercyclical 
payment program.  
 
Construction of a Green-Box Index 
 Let I be an index of conditions that would 
trigger a program payment. The index is 
constructed by making it a linear function of 
variables important to agriculture. The program 
would be countercyclical to the levels of the 
included variables. Define the index as 
 
I = a + b1X1 + b2X2 
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where X1 and X2 are the included variables, a 
is a constant, and b1 and b2 determine how 
changes in included variables change the 
index. To be classified as green box, X1 and X2 
cannot be price, yield, or revenue. In addition, 
they cannot be variables that are directly 
related or determined by prices or yields, such 
as stocks-to-use ratios, production levels, or 
export levels. What might qualify as green box 
are variables such as exchange rates and 
weather, which have no one-to-one relation-
ship with price, yield, or revenue. 
 
 Section 6, Annex 2 of the WTO Agree-
ment on Agriculture sets out the criteria for 
when income support can be declared as 
decoupled income support and consequently 
qualify as falling within the green box. 
Subsection b states: “The amount of such 
payments in any given year shall not be related 
to, or based on, the type or volume of produc-
tion (including livestock units) undertaken by 
the producer in any year after the base period.” 
Subsection c states: “The amount of such 
payments in any given year shall not be related 
to, or based on, the prices, domestic or 
international, applying to any production in 
any year after the base period.”   
 
 The key issue is what “related to” means. 
If “related to” means having a relationship 
such as revenue has to price and yield, then 
program payments based on weather and 
exchange rates should be green box. If, 
however, “related to” means having a relation-
ship such as July rainfall in Iowa has to U.S. 
aggregate corn production, then program 
payments would not be green box.  
 
 A countercyclical program can be 
constructed that is countercyclical to factors 
that are important to agriculture, such as 
growing-region weather and exchange rates. 
Such a program could provide risk manage-
ment benefits. Or, a countercyclical policy 
could be countercyclical to factors that are 
completely unrelated to price or yield, such as 
sunspot activities or the average daily winter 
temperature in Siberia. This latter program 
clearly would be green box and could provide 
significant income support to farmers. But the 
payments would arrive randomly. In this 
paper, we construct an index for each program 
crop by including a relevant weather variable 
and a relevant exchange rate. (Whether such 
an index would be declared green box is as 
much a political decision as a legal decision 
because the administration would have to 
defend such a declaration in the court of world 
public opinion and to the WTO.) 
 
 To begin, we normalize the index so it has 
a value of 100 when the exchange rate is set at 
its 2001 value and when the weather variable is 
set at its historical mean value. Payments will 
be made if the value of the index falls below 
some trigger level, denoted as I*. That is, if       
I < I* then program payments would be made. 
Under most policy proposals before Congress, 
program payments would be made under 2001 
conditions. In this case I* would be greater than 
100. A pure safety net program that would pay 
off only when market revenue fell significantly 
below projected market levels could be 
simulated by setting I* < 100.  
 
 Let I* = 100 + adj where adj denotes an 
adjustment factor that helps determine the 
expected size and frequency of program 
payments. Let max payment be the maximum 
payment that can be made under the program, 
perhaps equaling expected market revenue. 
For a given value of I, the size of the payment 
is as follows: 
 
Payment = max 0, 1
*
I
max payment
I
é ù-ê úë û
 
 
Given this formulation, if the ratio of I to I* 
is 0.8, then a payment equal to 20 percent of 
the maximum payment would be made. If the 
ratio of I to I* is 1.1, then no payment would 
be made. 
 
Estimation of I 
 Table 1 presents the weather variables 
used to determine the level of I for each 
program crop. The values of the weather 
variables actually used in the index are the 
deviations of the variables from a given level 
deemed “optimum” in Table 2. This label is
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TABLE 1. Definitions of weather variables used to construct the index 
Crop Weather Variable 
“Optimum” 
Value 
Corn, sorghum, 
and barley  Average July precipitation in Iowa and Illinois     5 in 
Soybeans Average August precipitation in Iowa and Illinois     5 in 
Wheat Average July precipitation in the United States    3 in 
Oats Average June precipitation in North and South Dakota     4.25 in 
Rice Average July temperature in Arkansas    82° F 
Cotton Average July precipitation in Texas and Mississippi     4.25 in 
 
 
TABLE 2. Parameter values used to construct the index 
Crop Intercept (a) Weather (b1) Exchange Rate (b2) 
Corn, sorghum, and barley 196.8 -9.3 -0.6 
Soybeans 189.1 -11.7 -0.5 
Wheat 207.9 -26.5 -0.8 
Oats 196.4 -13.0 -0.6 
Rice 203.9 -6.2 -0.7 
Cotton 202.2 -11.8 -0.7 
 
used because for a given value of the exchange 
rate, the index value is maximized at this level. 
The second variable used for each crop is the 
July value for the U.S. agricultural trade-
weighted exchange rate, published by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Economic 
Research Service (USDA-ERS). 
 
 Table 2 presents the values of a, b1, and 
b2. These values were obtained by imposing the 
following set of identifying restrictions. First, 
the value of the index equals 100 when the 
weather variable is set at its long-run average 
value (which is different than its “optimum” 
value reported in Table 2) and when the level of 
the exchange rate equals its July 2001 value. 
The second restriction is that the maximum 
value of the index is set at 140 and it is 
achieved at the “optimum” level of the weather 
variable and an exchange rate of 90, which 
represents a 30 percent depreciation in the 
dollar from July 2001 levels. The third restric-
tion is that the minimum value of the index is 
set at 70 and it is achieved at the highest level 
of the weather variable observed (the greatest 
deviation) in the historical data (since 1895) 
and an exchange rate equal to 140. This value 
of the exchange rate is above the maximum 
value observed since 1975, which just happens 
to be the July 2001 value of 129.  
 
Historical Index Values 
 Figures 1–6 in the Appendix show the 
index values that would have occurred from 
1975 to 2001. The figures show how the index 
responds to variations in the weather variables 
and the exchange rate. For example, all show 
some decline in recent years because of the 
strong dollar. The coarse grains index shows 
that drought or flood (1983, 1988, and 1993) 
in the Corn Belt also results in a decline. 
Figure 6 shows particularly well how drought 
in Texas and Mississippi (2000) affects the 
cotton index. Figure 6 also shows, however, 
that such an aggregate index can miss regional 
disasters. In 1980, Texas cotton production 
was hit hard by drought. But the rest of the 
Cotton Belt was not. Consequently, the index 
value for 1980 equals 120. Thus, the index 
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program just outlined shares a characteristic 
with other countercyclical programs based on 
national triggers in that regional disasters may 
not trigger payments. (See Hart and Babcock, 
“Countercyclical Agricultural Program 
Payments: Is It Time to Look at Revenue?” 
December 2000, CARD Briefing Paper 00-BP 
28 [Revised].) 
 
Determination of I* 
 Actual implementation of this program 
requires determination of the values of I* and 
max payment. Increases in the level of I* raise 
the frequency with which payments would be 
made. Together, I* and max payment determine 
the size of program payments and aggregate 
program cost. Second, who qualifies for such 
payments and how the payments would be 
distributed would have to be specified. To 
qualify for the green box, the payments would 
have to be made on a historical acreage base. 
For example, the AMTA payment base or an 
updated base from 1996 to 2001 could be used.  
 
 Total program cost would be determined 
by the probability distribution of the vari-  
ables used to construct the index in combina-
tion with I*, max payment, and the selected 
payment base. Program cost is also highly 
dependent on the identifying restrictions used to 
construct the index. For example, increasing the 
maximum value and decreasing the minimum 
value would increase program costs. 
 
 To implement such a program, a level of 
max payment would need to be specified. For 
purposes of discussion, suppose that max 
payment is set equal to the per unit value 
implied by the Adjusted Target Revenues 
 reported in Table 3 of Hart and Babcock 
(“Effects of Adding a Target Revenue Pro-
gram and Soybean Fixed Decoupled Payments 
to Current Farm Programs,” CARD Briefing 
Paper 01-BP 35, September 2001). Table 3 
reports these values, as well as the number of 
production units on which per unit (bushel, 
hundredweight, or pound) payments would be 
made. Given these per unit values and the 
probability distributions of weather and 
exchange rates, total budget costs are deter-
mined by specifying a value for I*.  
 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between 
average program costs over 10 years and I*.  
The critical maintained assumption in the 
Figure 7 results is that the mean of exchange 
rates is held constant over the entire program 
period.  Exchange rates over time likely follow 
a random walk process, but we did not have 
adequate time to analyze this process. Including 
a random walk would likely leave average 
program costs unchanged, but increase the 
likelihood of both large and small 10-year 
program costs. 
 
As shown in Figure 7, increases in I* in-
crease total costs at an increasing rate, much 
like increasing the coverage level on a crop 
insurance policy increases premium at an 
increasing rate.  Given a budget level, one can 
solve for the value of I* that achieves this 
program cost. For example, suppose that the 
10-year available budget for the countercyclical 
payment program equals $110 billion, less the 
cost of the marketing loan program ($31.8 
billion), less the cost of fixed decoupled 
payments ($52 billion), or $26.2 billion.   As 
shown in Figure 7, this would imply an I* value 
of about 100. 
 
 
TABLE 3. Values for max payment and number of production units 
Crop 
max payment 
($/Unit) 
Production 
Unitsa 
(Million 
Units) Crop 
max payment 
($/Unit) 
Production 
Unitsa 
(Million 
Units) 
Corn 2.49  9,504 Rice 10.56  191 
Soybeans 6.69  2,688 Cotton 0.7202  8,215 
Wheat 3.46  2,299 Barley 2.50  326 
Oats 1.49  150 Sorghum 2.33  592 
aRice units are hundredweight, cotton units are pounds, and all other units are bushels.
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FIGURE 1. Corn, sorghum, and barley 
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FIGURE 2. Soybeans 
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FIGURE 3. Wheat 
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FIGURE 4. Oats 
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FIGURE 5. Rice 
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FIGURE 6. Cotton 
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FIGURE 7. Effect of increasing I* on 10-year program costs 
